Immortali miti keynesiani


Questo articolo di Steve Hanke sull'ennesima esibizione di ingenuità vetero-keynesiana di Krugman è significativo non tanto per la critica di Hanke, che a me sembra peraltro fondata, quanto per la superficialità della tesi di Krugman che fa temere che il Nobel per le scienze economiche corra il rischio di fare la fine di quello per la letteratura (vedi Fo) o per la pace (vedi Gore, Obama e innumerevoli altri)!

Prof. Krugman Is Wrong, Again
Posted by Steve H. Hanke

Prof. Paul Krugman asserts in his New York Times column of May 31st that “Both textbook economics and experience say that slashing spending when you’re still suffering from high unemployment is a really bad idea – not only does it deepen the slump, but it does little to improve the budget outlook, because much of what governments save by spending less they lose as a weaker economy depresses tax receipts.”

While Prof. Krugman and most other fiscalists believe this to be self-evident, it is not. Indeed, this fiscalist dogma fails to withstand the indignity of empirical verification. Prof. Paul Krugman’s formulation fails to mention the state of confidence. This is an important oversight. As Keynes himself put it: “The state of confidence, as they term it, is a matter to which practical men pay the closest and most anxious attention.”

By ignoring the confidence factor, economic theory can lead to wildly incorrect conclusions and misguided policies. Just consider naive Keynesian fiscal theory – the type presented (as Prof. Krugman notes) in textbooks and embraced by most policymakers and the general public. According to Keynesian theory, an expansionary fiscal policy (an increase in government spending and/or a decrease in taxes) stimulates the economy, at least for a year or two after the fiscal stimulus. To put the brakes on the economy, Keynesians counsel a fiscal contraction.

A positive fiscal multiplier is the keystone for Keynesian fiscal theory because it is through the multiplier that changes in the budget balance are transmitted to the economy. With a positive multiplier, there is a positive relationship between changes in the fiscal deficit and economic growth: larger deficits stimulate growth and smaller ones slow things down.

So much for theory. What about the real world? Suppose a country has a very large budget deficit. As a result, market participants might be worried that a further loosening of fiscal conditions would result in more inflation, higher risk premiums and much higher interest rates. In such a situation, the fiscal multipliers may be negative. Fiscal expansion would then dampen economic activity and a fiscal contraction would increase economic activity. These results would be just the opposite of those predicted by naive Keynesian fiscal theory.

The possibility of a negative fiscal multiplier rests on the central role played by confidence and expectations about the course of future policy. If, for example, a country with a very large budget deficit and high level of debt (estimated U.S. deficit and debt levels as a percentage of GDP for 2010 are 10.3% and 63.2%, respectively) makes a credible commitment to significantly reduce the deficit, a confidence shock will ensue and the economy will boom, as inflation expectations, risk premiums and long-term interest rates decline.

There have been many cases in which negative fiscal multipliers have been observed. The Danish fiscal squeeze of 1983-86 and the Irish stabilization of 1987-89 are notable. The fiscal deficits that preceded the Danish and Irish fiscal squeezes were clearly unsustainable, and risk premiums and interest rates were extremely high. Confidence shocks accompanied the fiscal squeezes, and with negative multipliers in play, the Danish and Irish economies took off. (Evidence from the U.S. is presented in an article by Professors Jason E. Taylor and Richard K. Vedder which appears in the current May/June 2010 issue of the Cato Policy Report.)

Margaret Thatcher also made a dash for confidence and growth via a fiscal squeeze. To restart the economy in 1981, Thatcher instituted a fierce attack on the British deficit, coupled with an expansionary monetary policy. Her moves were immediately condemned by 364 distinguished economists. In a letter to the Times of London, they wrote a knee-jerk Keynesian (Prof. Krugman-type) response: “Present policies will deepen the depression, erode the industrial base of our economy and threaten its social and political stability.” Thatcher was quickly vindicated. No sooner had the 364 affixed their signatures than the economy boomed. People had confidence in Britain again, and Thatcher was able to introduce a long series of deep free-market reforms.

While Prof. Krugman’s authority is weighty, his arguments and evidence are slender.


Steve H. Hanke
Professor of Applied Economics
The Johns Hopkins University
Baltimore, MD 21218-2686
United States

Telephone: (410) 516-7183
Telefax: (410) 516-8996
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Caro amico,

i "mercati" non esistono, esistono gli individui. Questi hanno l'abitudine di cercare di capire cosa succederà e di scommettere con quanti la pensano diversamente. Qualche volta sbagliano e perdono soldi, altre volte guadagnano. Se guadagnano non è detto che per ciò solo siano malvagi, se perdono non sono necessariamente nobili o fessi. L'unica differenza rilevante è che i privati scommettono soldi loro, banchieri centrali e politici soldi nostri.

Non devi restare in quell'ambiente (Ministero dell'economia?) o finirai col blaterare anche tu insensatezze contro i "mercatisti" (o "marchettisti"?).